However, if an NPM had made the majority of its sales in certain states, it could obtain a refund of those trust payments, beyond what it would have paid each of those states if it were an MPS. For example, an NPM that holds 50 percent of its revenue in Kansas (which has a relatively small share of access to space) would get an unblocking of its Trust Fund in Kansas to the tune of more than 49 percent of its total trust payment. In other words, the original Allocable Share release system created an involuntary loophole: it only worked as expected when NPMs distributed their products nationally. In this case, all of the MNP trust commitments to all states with similar tobacco laws amounted to roughly the payments made by these NMMs under the WMA. However, if an NPM concentrates its sales on a small number of countries with low percentages of units, the NPM could be reimbursed for a large portion of its fiduciary payments. Because the percentage of Kansas was so low — about 0.8 percent — NPMs concentrated their sales in Kansas and other countries to get immediate infidelity refunds from those countries. The “Allocable Share Release Repeal” (“ASR Repeal”) revised the initial calculation of the repayment of the trust`s status to remove the reference to the state`s allocable share to LMSA`s annual payment. HN2The amended status therefore provides that an NPM is entitled to reimbursement, to the extent that a tobacco manufacturer finds that the amount it was to place in trust is based on units sold in the state. in any given year, above the [MSA], as set in accordance with Section IX, paragraph i, of this agreement, including after the final conclusion of all adjustments that that manufacturer should have made on the basis of the units sold, if it were a participating producer, the surplus is released by Treuhand and reset to that tobacco manufacturer.  To calculate sales of domestic units based on U.S.
Department of Agriculture data, we used U.S. consumption values that decreased imports and adjustments (changes in inventories and not taken into account). In terms of market share, we looked at the market share of the original participating producers (OPMs) who were Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard and Brown-Williamson. Liggett was excluded from this analysis because it was not an OPM, but another participating producer (PMS) in the MSA. The FTC companies were Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, Lorillard, Liggett, Brown-Williamson and Commonwealth Brands (discount producers). On the basis of data until 1998, trend lines (Figures 2 to 5) were estimated in years using an equation with an intercept and an explanatory variable. For each year, 1999-2002, predicted values were generated on the basis of the results. To determine whether the differences before and after MSA were significant, we conducted t tests for the difference between actual and predicted values and post-MSA and pre-MSA values. Although the MSA was negotiated in response to the cost of treating tobacco-related diseases, it does not require states to use the resources necessary to implement and maintain tobacco prevention and control activities. The Public Health Law Center reports that in 2015, only 1.9% of the $25.6 billion received by MSA states was earmarked for tobacco control programs. Other data sources include press articles, 10-K reports submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), market share data from the Maxwell Report (Tobacco Report), policy reports from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (Exports) and the Federal Trade Commission (Advertisement), and auditing magazine articles.